Turkey’s coercive diplomacy practice in the cyprus crisis of 1967 with its political, military and legal dimensions 1967 kıbrıs krizi’nde siyasi, askerî ve hukuki boyutlarıyla türkiye’nin zorlayıcı diplomasi uygulaması


Şener B.

Journal of Modern Turkish History, vol.16, no.31, pp.271-304, 2020 (Refereed Journals of Other Institutions) identifier

  • Publication Type: Article / Article
  • Volume: 16 Issue: 31
  • Publication Date: 2020
  • Title of Journal : Journal of Modern Turkish History
  • Page Numbers: pp.271-304
  • Keywords: Coercive Diplomacy, Colonels’ Coup, Cyprus Crisis of 1967, Enosis, Suleyman Demirel

Abstract

© 2020, Hacettepe University. All rights reserved.The Cyprus Crisis of 1967 emerged as a crisis that had first arisen on the island following the Cyprus Crisis of 1963-1964 just after the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, and which recurred within a spiral of violence that continued at intervals albeit at different intensities. The activities of enosis supporters under the leadership of Archbishop Makarios, the President of the Republic of Cyprus, in line with the pro-enosis policies of the Colonels’ Junta that took power in Greece in April 1967 by coup d’état had a significant role in the crisis that occurred upon the heavily armed attacks carried out by Greek National Guard forces led by Colonel Grivas, the leader of EOKA, against the villages of Geçitkale and Boğaziçi where Turkish Cypriots lived collectively. On the other hand, at a time when the attention was turned to the Middle East with the Arab-Israeli War that broke out on June 5, 1967, the Colonels’ Junta’s trying to exploit the atmosphere created in the international arena by this war in his favor provided a favorable basis for the crisis. The then government of Turkey under Süleyman Demirel, the Prime Minister strived to develop and implement a strategy of coercive diplomacy by taking into account the unique circumstances of the crisis. In this context, the Demirel government determined stopping the attacks against Turkish Cypriots as the first and primary target and it aimed to make its Greek counterparts accept that Turkey would never consent any changes to the Zurich and London Agreements of 1959, the basis of order on the island, with unilateral actions and decisions and to secure the rights of the Turkish Cypriot community living on the island. Continuing its diplomatic initiatives to achieve this goal, the Demirel government tried to rationalize a “coercive diplomatic” strategy, including the use of a limited military force to be put it into operation, in line with the Treaty of Guarantee, if the violence actions against the Turkish Cypriot community on the island could not be stopped. The fact that Turkey did not have the necessary military equipment and was not adequately prepared for a successful intervention in Cyprus at that time forced the Demirel government to be more careful in keeping open channels of reconciliation and negotiation to resolve the crisis. Accordingly, Turkey tried to use military and diplomatic tools in compatible and consistent with each other while seeking to ensure the credibility and deterrent force of its threats of force use during the crisis by applying methods of non-violent military repression. It also supported the mediation initiatives of third parties and was careful to limit its demands so that the crisis could be resolved peacefully. As a result, the Cyprus Crisis of 1967 achieved a successful resolution from the Turkish viewpoint. This study examines the occurrence, development and end of the Cyprus Crisis of 1967, within the framework of crisis management put forward by Turkey and “coercive diplomacy” strategy that underpins this crisis management, with the descriptive and historical analysis method.