Despite the policy-relevant aspirations of military regimes, scholars have shown surprisingly little interest in exploring the agenda dynamics and policy processes in these regimes. We sought to close this gap by analysing the original datasets of over 13,000 legislative speeches, public budgets, and the background characteristics of 160 representatives who served in the Consultative Assembly of the military regime of Kenan Evren in Turkey (1980-1983). Empirical analyses indicate that the regime's policy priorities did not differ significantly from those of democratic governments, and that while representatives with military backgrounds showed far more interest in the core functions of the government, the process through which they were selected (whether or not directly appointed by the National Security Council) appeared to have no explanatory power. Perhaps more importantly, there were more similarities than differences between the military regime of Kenan Evren and the coalition, minority and majority governments of the 1970s and 1980s. Our findings imply that the effect of institutions on policy agendas is overstated.