Analysis of Sequence Number Spoofing Attacks on IEEE 802.1CB Frame Replication and Elimination
IEEE Access, 2026 (SCI-Expanded, Scopus)
- Yayın Türü: Makale / Tam Makale
- Basım Tarihi: 2026
- Doi Numarası: 10.1109/access.2026.3751406
- Dergi Adı: IEEE Access
- Derginin Tarandığı İndeksler: Science Citation Index Expanded (SCI-EXPANDED), Scopus, Compendex, INSPEC, Directory of Open Access Journals
- Anahtar Kelimeler: IEEE 802.1CB Frame Replication and Elimination, Sequence Number Spoofing, Time-Sensitive Networking, TSN security
- Karadeniz Teknik Üniversitesi Adresli: Evet
Özet
IEEE 802.1CB Frame Replication and Elimination for Reliability (FRER) is a key mechanism in Time-Sensitive Networking (TSN) that provides fault tolerance by replicating frames across multiple paths and eliminating duplicates based on sequence numbers. FRER does not provide cryptographic origin or integrity verification for FRER sequence numbers, making the duplicate elimination process vulnerable to manipulation through first-arrival attacks. This paper presents a simulation-based analysis of sequence number spoofing under three attacker models: blind injection, which assumes no sequence number knowledge; observed injection, which infers sequence numbers from observed traffic; and informed injection, which serves as a controlled reference case with exact sequence knowledge. The results reveal a clear distinction between blind injection and sequence-aware attackers. Blind injection can capture the recovery state despite randomized initial sequence numbers, with mean legitimate-frame loss decreasing from 91.423% at an injection period of 25 μs to 43.563% at 100 μs; its effectiveness therefore depends strongly on the injection period. Under representative symmetric-path conditions, observed and informed injection caused 100% legitimate-frame loss with fixed-period traffic and 89.473–95.001% mean loss with jittered traffic. The path-timing experiments show that source jitter, path-delay magnitude and placement, and burst size alter the first-arrival race and the extent of suppression. The sensitivity analysis further shows that recovery configuration and attacker parameter selection determine the boundary between suppression and attack failure. These findings also show that reducing the history length should not be treated as a security mitigation against sequence-aware injection.